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inTRODUCTiOn
The voluntary withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH) in patients with severe dis-
orders of consciousness (DoC, e.g., permanent vegetative states) constitutes a fundamental ethical 
issue extending beyond the boundaries of end-of-life decisions. The term “Vegetative State” was 
originally adopted to define “an organic body capable of growth and development but devoid of 
sensation and thought” (1). In this frame, the traditional approach toward the suspension of ANH 
rested upon the view that patients in the Vegetative State had no residual capability to perceive pain 
(2, 3). However, over the past few decades, an increasing number of studies (4–11) have shown that 
strong claims about awareness in patients without behavioral responses to commands are unwar-
ranted. Furthermore, there is again a high percentage of misdiagnoses in the assessment of these 
patients (12–14).
Recently it was proposed the alternative name “unresponsive wakefulness syndrome” (VS/UWS) 
(15), to define a condition characterized by the absence of response to commands or oriented 
voluntary movements in the presence of wakefulness. Neuroimaging studies demonstrated the exist-
ence of distinctive cerebral responses to noxious stimuli in conditions like VS/UWS and minimally 
conscious state (MCS) (16–18). Yet, there is no univocal consensus about pain perception in patients 
with DoC. In a study by Demertzi and colleagues (19), 2,059 medical and paramedical professionals 
from 32 European countries were asked the following question: “can a patient in vegetative state feel 
pain?” Over 40% of those surveyed replied that these patients do not feel pain. The percentage was 
higher among medical doctors compared to paramedical caregivers (54 and 32%, respectively). This 
view was substantiated by the idea that, in the absence of consciousness, patients were not capable 
of experiencing and reporting a painful experience. However, recent advances in the pathophysiol-
ogy of DoC, debunking the original tenet that patients with DoC do not perceive pain, suggest a 
reconsideration of the voluntary withdrawal of ANH (20).
In this manuscript, we will briefly review the recent literature indicating that some patients with 
DoC reveal a form of residual awareness (21) and that they are capable of perceiving painful stimuli 
and exhibiting consistent responses to them. Furthermore, empirical evidence in the literature sug-
gests that, when tested with the appropriate tools, these patients can exhibit consistent reactions to 
emotionally salient stimuli (5, 10, 22–27). Based on these findings, we propose that the voluntary 
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withdrawal of ANH should be carefully reconsidered on medical 
and ethical grounding.
pAin: DEFiniTiOn AnD 
nEUROAnATOMiCAL SUBSTRATES
Pain is defined as “… an unpleasant sensory and emotional 
experience arising from actual or potential tissue damage or 
described in terms of such damage…” (28). Likewise, McCaffrey 
and Pasero (29) reported that “Pain is whatever the experiencing 
person says it is, existing whenever the experiencing person says 
it does.” Such subjectivity implies that pain may only be detected 
when a patient reports its manifestation. Therefore, the pres-
ence of consciousness would seem to constitute a fundamental 
prerequisite in the individual appraisal and experience of pain. 
Analogous considerations may be applied to the concept of suffer-
ing, defined as “the state of severe distress associated with events 
that threaten the intactness of the person” (30). Furthermore, 
Turk and Wilson (31) proposed that “a person might experience 
significant pain-related suffering from a relatively low-level 
noxious stimulation if she or he believes the implications are 
ominous, interminable, and beyond their control” (31). Within 
this framework, both pain and suffering seem to require the pres-
ence of consciousness.
Several authors have shown that nociceptive stimuli elicit the 
activation of an extensive cortical network including somatosen-
sory, insular, and cingulate areas, as well as frontal and parietal 
areas (32, 33). In particular, nociception refers to the perception 
(conscious or not) of nociceptive stimuli (28). The stimulation 
of nociceptors leads to the transmission of information via the 
spinothalamic tract to the thalamus and on to the cortex, with 
the midbrain and thalamus thought to be involved in the modu-
lation of reflex response to nociceptive stimuli (34). The cortical 
nociceptive network entails the secondary somatosensory (S2) 
cortex, with the posterior insula (lateral network), taking part 
in the sensory–discriminative features of the pain processing 
(35, 36). However, the generation of a conscious experience of 
pain requires the activation of a more complex network. This 
network is often referred to as the “pain matrix.” The pain matrix 
entails two main subsystems (37): the lateral neuronal network 
[secondary somatosensory (S2) cortex, lateral thalamus, and 
posterior insula], encoding sensory–discriminative informa-
tion (38), and the medial network [anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC) and prefrontal cortex], encoding affective–cognitive 
information (39). Also, the cerebellum plays a major role in 
processing aversive stimuli including pain (40), contributing 
to the sensory–discriminative part of the pain processing net-
work. Finally, motor-related areas (e.g., the striatum, cerebel-
lum, and the supplementary motor area) are involved in pain 
perception and processing (41). In addition to identifying the 
neuroanatomical structures involved in pain perception, these 
studies investigated the dynamics of activation (connectivity) 
of the pain matrix. Thus, results on cortical potential suggest 
that nociceptive input is first processed in the posterior insula, 
wherein it is coded in terms of intensity and anatomical location, 
and then conveyed to the anterior insula, where the emotional 
reaction to pain is elaborated (36, 42, 43).
Furthermore, several authors demonstrated the existence in 
humans of multiple somatotopic representations of pain within 
the operculo-insular region. This mechanism may constitute 
a sensory-integration site that selectively targets emotional 
responses toward the specific injured body-site (44). Finally, the 
pain matrix has been shown to vary with age and in response 
to the onset of pathologies. Some authors have suggested that 
structural deficits in regions involved in the modulation of pain, 
and in their connectivity, occur in chronic pain syndromes (45).
pAin in pATiEnTS WiTH DOC
Pioneering studies attempting to quantify nociception in patients 
with DoC (46) systematically measured physiological variables 
like eye opening, breathing, heart rate, and blood pressure, and 
occasionally grimace-like or crying-like behavior (47). However, 
notwithstanding their heuristic value, these signs are considered 
to be of subcortical origin, not necessarily reflecting a conscious 
perception of pain. Additional quantitative measurements of 
nociception in patients with DoC reported stereotyped responses 
(i.e., slow generalized flexion or extension of the upper and lower 
extremities), flexion withdrawal (i.e., withdrawal of the limb away 
from the point of the stimulation), and localization responses 
(i.e., the non-stimulated limb locates and makes contact with the 
stimulated body part at the point of stimulation), all of which 
were linked, respectively, to brainstem, subcortical, or cortical 
activity (nociceptive network or pain matrix) (32, 46, 48).
Other studies investigated the extent to which the pain matrix 
responded to nociceptive stimuli in patients with DoC. For 
example, Boly et al. (16) observed that, in response to a noxious 
stimulus, patients in MCS showed “pain matrix” activation simi-
lar to that seen in normal controls (16). Patients in VS/UWS also 
showed activation in the pain matrix, although this activation was 
much less prominent compared to controls (16). An independent 
study performed by Markl et  al. (49) observed the presence of 
significant activation in the sensory and affective components of 
the pain matrix in patients characterized by severe DoC (49). In a 
study adopting laser-evoked potentials, the authors observed that 
painful stimuli may be processed even in patients with severe brain 
damage (50). Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has 
also been used to investigate brain mechanisms underlying the 
perception of pain in patients with DoC. Using this paradigm, 
Monti et al. (20) demonstrated that patients with a diagnosis of 
“unresponsive wakefulness syndrome” (UWS), evaluated at the 
bedside, exhibited measurable awareness. Therefore, the authors 
proposed that negative results in clinical trials or activation pro-
tocols do not necessarily imply the absence of cognitive processes 
in these patients (20). Alternatively, it may be suggested that these 
patients were misdiagnosed due to the technical constraints of the 
bedside evaluation. Retrospective reports of patients surviving 
intensive care constitute an additional indication that patients 
with DoC may exhibit some form of appraisal of noxious stimuli. 
These individuals report vivid memories of pain, noise, sleep dep-
rivation, thirst, hunger, heat, cold, fear, anxiety, isolation, physical 
restraint, lack of information, and absence of daylight (51).
These empirical data corroborate the view that although patients 
with DoC may not be capable of exhibiting a detectable reaction 
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to painful stimuli, they may nonetheless be capable of perceiving 
them (52). These data do not demonstrate that all patients with 
severe disorders of consciousness perceive and/or exhibit pain; yet, 
they demonstrate that several patients, deemed incapable of expe-
riencing pain, showed a consistent response to noxious stimuli. 
Regardless of whether this is due to misdiagnosis or technical 
limitations, these data contravene the tenet that all patients with 
severe disorders of consciousness do not experience pain.
COnCLUSiOn
For patients with severe pathologies (e.g., terminally ill), the 
dehydration and starvation may have benefits (patients could be 
intolerant of enteral feeding because of abdominal distension, 
vomiting, diarrhea, or fluid overload) and to refuse food and fluids 
and to have relief of distress through provision of medicine may 
be a right (53). However, most patients in VS/UWS are unlikely 
to be intolerant of nutrition and hydration that are considered 
basic compassionate care because they promote physical and 
emotional well-being (54, 55). Withdrawal of ANH has biologic 
consequences including distress and pain (56).
Neurophysiological and fMRI studies are finding ways to assess 
awareness in VS/UWS patients (57, 58). The identification of the 
“pain matrix” along with the design of experimental tools capable 
of detecting consistent patterns of brain activation in response to 
noxious stimuli allowed us to integrate the original definitions 
of pain, which rested largely upon subjective experiences with 
objective measurements.
These data, which bestow a heuristic advancement in the 
study of pain and consciousness, may also foster a reconsidera-
tion of the general attitude toward the management of pain in 
patients with DoC. Herein, our main interest is directed toward 
the withdrawal of ANH in these patients. With respect to the 
latter, Ogino and collaborators (59) demonstrated that dehydra-
tion, in control subjects, leads to increased brain activity in the 
anatomical structures involved in pain perception (ACC, insula, 
and thalamus). Thus, dehydration may per se constitute a source 
of pain in healthy subjects (60). Furthermore, Perry et  al. (60) 
reported that hydration status is an important modulator of the 
cerebrovascular response to cold pressor tests, which are com-
monly used to investigate cerebrovascular regulation. Therefore, 
dehydration may not only constitute a source of pain but also 
interfere with the ability to assess a nociceptive response in the 
patient. Ultimately, current experimental knowledge supports 
the notion that voluntary withdrawal of hydration may, under 
specific conditions, constitute a source of pain. Given the empiri-
cal data reported above, concerning pain perception in patients 
with DoC, it is tenable that the primary ethical, clinical, and 
deontological concerns shall relate to the suffering of the patient. 
Within this framework, the voluntary withdrawal of ANH may 
raise ethical concerns worth being addressed.
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